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COMMENTS
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND THE
OUT OF STATE DIVORCE
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution' might be regarded
by some as the savior of the union from anarchy,2 but it has been respon-
sible for the creation of an almost unsolvable problem in the field of di-
vorce law. By the ruling in the case of Williams v. North Carolina,3 a
divorce may be granted at any site where one of the parties to the mar-
riage has acquired a bona fide domicile, in the eyes of the divorce granting
state, and this divorce will be upheld outside of the state on the basis of
the full faith and credit clause, so long as no question of jurisdiction of the
granting state is raised in the state required to recognize the decree.
That case brought to the fore an entirely new view as to the type of
domicile needed to obtain a valid divorce. The United States Supreme
Court, in the Williams case, which involved a bigamy prosecution, over-
ruled the prior case of Haddock v. Haddock4 which had introduced for
the first time the concept of an in personam divorce in American law.
It is to be noted in the Williams case that no attack was made, by the
party contesting the divorce, on the determination by the divorce granting
court that domicile existed. The case was vigorously dissented to as sub-
stituting the divorce law of the state granting the divorce for that of the
state of original residence.5
The protests of the dissenters were soon heard again when North Caro-
lina reinstituted the bigamy prosecution and attempted a collateral attack
on the finding that domicile existed. This resulted in the rule, established
in the second case of Williams v. North Carolina,6 that a divorce action
based on bona fide domicile must be recognized, but that the sister state
can take evidence to determine if domicile, in the eyes of the sister state,
was actually established. The jurisdiction of the court granting the decree
is presumed in all states;7 thus the burden of showing lack of a bona fide
domicile is on the party contesting the recognition of the decree., Wil-
liams 1I refers only to proceedings based on a constructive service where
one of the parties was unable to, or did not care to, appear. The ex parte
1 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1.
2 Discussed in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942).
3317 U.S. 287 (1942).
4201 U.S. 562 (1906).
5 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
0 325 U.S. 226 (1945). This case is commonly referred to as Williams II, and the
first Williams case as Williams I.
7Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
s Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) iRice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
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case causes no problem in the jurisdiction granting the decree, but Wil-
liams II leaves one who gets an ex parte decree in an unsecure position as
to the recognition of the decree in sister states. The unstable situation
promulgated by Williams II has continued to this day. Thus, a person
getting a divorce can have it attacked in another state on the basis of lack
of domicile and may be placed in an awkward position if he has re-
married. 9
As a result of Williams I, New York has seen fit to enact a statute allow-
ing an injunction to be issued to prevent a plaintiff from carrying on
divorce proceedings in another state. That statute was subsequently held
constitutional by the New York Court of Appeals,1 ° the validity of simi-
lar statutes having been sustained by the United States Supreme Court."
The Williams cases have been thoroughly analyzed in many states, 12 in-
cluding Illinois,13 and one finds little to add to these decisions as to what
constitutes domicile.
Domicile properly is governed by the intent of the person to establish
a bona fide residence, and not a residence solely for purposes of divorce. 14
On analyzing some of the cases on domicile, note must be taken of out-
standing cases, such as Shain v. Shain,15 where the facts of residence and
proper domicile were established regardless of the fact that the parties
continued to move about the country.
Eisenwein v. Commonwealth16 considers the question of divorce where
9 As to the need of domicile and its adequacy as a basis for a proper divorce see
Justice Rutledge's dissent in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 255 (1945),
where he said: "I think a major operation is (necessary). The Constitution does not
mention domicile. Nowhere does it deposit the powers of the states or nation upon
that amorphous, highly variable common-law conception. Judges have imported it.
The importation, it should be clear by now, has failed in creating a workable consti-
tutional criterion for this delicate reason."
10 Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E. 2d 721 (1951).
11 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935).
12 Huggs v. Huggs, 195 F. 2d 771 (App. D.C., 1952); Locomotive Engineers Mut.
Life & Acc. Ins. Ass'n v. Laurant, 172 F. 2d 889 (C.A. 7th, 1949); Brandt v. Brandt,
76 Ariz. 154, 261 P. 2d 978 (1953); Patterson v. Patterson, 208 Ga. 7, 64 S.E. 2d 441
(1951); Stricklin v. Snavely, 175 Kan. 253, 262 P. 2d 823 (1953); Epstein v. Epstein,
193 Md. 164, 66 A. 2d 381 (1949); Stultz v. Stultz, 15 N.J. 315, 104 A. 2d 656 (1954);
Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E. 2d 748 (1951); Taylor v. Taylor, 242 S.W. 2d
747 (Ky. App., 1951); Genesse v. Genesse, 278 App. Div. 779, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 927 (2d
Dept., 1951).
'5Ludwig v. Ludwig, 413 Il. 44, 107 N.E. 2d 848 (1952); Atkins v. Atkins, 393 Ill.
202, 65 N.E. 2d 801 (1946); In re Rush's Estate, 350 I11. App. 120, 111 N.E. 2d 801
(1953).
14 Ulrey v. Ulrey, 231 Ind. 63, 106 N.E. 2d 793 (1952); Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass.
603, 88 N.E. 2d 143 (1949).
15 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E. 2d 143 (1949)?
16 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
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property and alimony are involved and, in the concurring opinion, evolves
the interesting theory that the effect of a divorce decree may be sepa-
rated, requiring the recognition of the termination of the marital status,
but allowing collateral inquiry into questions of property rights. This
theory was adopted in the companion cases of Estin v. Estin"7 and
Kreiger v. Kreiger.18 In the Estin case, the wife obtained a separate main-
tenance decree in New York. Subsequently, the husband established
domicile in Nevada and was granted an ex parte divorce after which he
ceased making the payments required by the New York decree. The wife
then petitioned the New York court seeking the arrearage of separate
maintenance payments. The court ruled in favor of the wife, holding that
the separate maintenance decree survives the divorce decree. The United
States Supreme Court, in affirming the New York decree, adopted the
theory of divisible divorce, that is, the termination of the marital status
must be recognized under full faith and credit but the decree need not be
given effect in regard to property outside of the jurisdiction of the
divorce granting state. This is the theory promulgated by Justice Douglas
in the Eisenwein case. One might conclude from this that the Estin case,
although not affecting the rights of a spouse to property and alimony in
an ex parte suit, has destroyed the marital status and thus will not allow
a prosecution for bigamy in the state of domiciliary origin, as was the
case in Williams II.
The probable reason for the Estin theory is thus stated by Justice
Douglas:
The state has considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in
protecting the offspring of marriages from being bastardized. The interest of
the State extends to its domiciliaries. The State should have the power to guard
its interest in them by changing or altering their marital status throughout the
farthest reaches of the nation. For a person domiciled in one State should not
be allowed to suffer the penalties of bigamy for living outside the State with
the only one which the State of his domicile recognizes as his lawful wife.
And children born of the only marriage which is lawful in the State of his
domicile would not carry the stigma of bastardy when they move elsewhere.' 9
The case of Rice v. Rice20 merits watching because of its significance
in reaffirming Williams II. The Rice case was not a bigamy prosecution as
its illustrious predecessor, but did follow the same theory as to domicile,
thus adding fuel to the already bright fire of confusion existing in the
field of divorce law. It is interesting to note that four justices dissented
in the Rice case, 21 indicating that there still is vigorous disagreement with
this reasoning. The late Justice Jackson also restated a prior opinion that
17 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
18 334 U.S. 555 (1948). 20 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
19 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948), 21 Justices Black, Douglas, Rutledge and Jackson.
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to allow this type of divorce action without personal service on the party
being sued is to deprive one of procedural due process.
Another aspect of the problem concerning recognition of foreign
divorce decrees arises when the court has personal jurisdiction over both
of the parties. The general rule is that when both parties appear, neither
can subsequently attack the finding as to domicile in a collateral proceed-
ing. This rule is illustrated in the leading cases of Sherrer v. Sherrer22 and
Coe v. Coe,23 where the personal appearance of both parties was the fac-
tor requiring full faith and credit. In these cases, the United States Su-
preme Court followed the view enunciated in the earlier case of Davis v.
Davis.24 Thus, the appearance of both parties can forestall protest on the
part of one party as to jurisdiction of the divorce granting court, on the
basis that he appeared and had his day in court.
A recent extension of the personal appearance doctrine is found in the
case of Johnson v. Muelberger.25 A personal appearance was made by the
husband's attorney in answer to a suit brought in Florida by the hus-
band's second wife; the divorce was granted and subsequently the hus-
band remarried for a third time. Upon his death the husband's daughter
contested the validity of the second wife's divorce in order to stop the
father's third wife from taking a statutory share of the estate. The failure
of the second wife to meet the Florida ninety-day residence requirement
was the daughter's main point of contention. The Court decided that the
child would not be allowed to attack the divorce, since neither of the
parties themselves would have this remedy available, because both had ap-
peared in the divorce granting court and had a chance to attack the juris-
diction there; thus, the action was res judicata to the daughter as well as
to her parents. Justice Frankfurter dissented to this ruling, just as he did
in the Sherrer and Coe cases, being of the opinion that an attack, barred
to the parties to the divorce, should be available to a stranger to the
action. His opinion, however, has lost strength, and the majority opinion
is more vigorous than ever after the recent case of Cook v. Cook.2 6 In
that case, though Justice Frankfurter dissented,2 7 he failed to propound
the theory of the previous case that full faith and credit, although not
available to a party to a suit, is available to a stranger.28
22 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
23 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
24 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
25 340 U.S. 581 (1951). Also see 46 111. L. Rev. 307 (1951).
26 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
27 Ibid., at 129.
28 For an interesting case on full faith and credit plus res judicata, see Sutton v.
Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1951).
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A recent offshoot of the Johnson case was a Virginia case which ex-
tended the doctrine of res judicata, allowing it to apply to a stranger
where one of the parties to the case did not appear and was given only
constructive service.29 This type of extension, if ever contested, might
prove too broad.
In other cases involving personal appearances by both parties, there is
a great variety of opinion as to when personal appearance should be con-
sidered adequate to allow the theory of the Sherrer and Coe30 cases to
govern. A New Jersey case where, by the use of fraud, a personal appear-
ance was signed away, was not allowed to come under the personal ap-
pearance theory, because the court refused to say that in reality both
parties to the action had appeared and had a chance to contest jurisdic-
tion.31 Staedler v. Staedler,3 2 a recent case in New Jersey, was also decided
on a personal appearance basis. Although an appearance was made by both
parties, the state refused to recognize the appearance because of the juris-
dictional issue of domicile. Supposedly, the appearance of both parties
would have been adequate to establish res judicata, but here it was not. In
the Staedler case evidence was introduced to show that the husband had
induced his wife to perjure herself on the jurisdictional point of domicile;
thus fraud was shown, and personal appearance was not deemed adequate
to overcome the fraud.
Other recent cases have shown varied opinions on what is adequate to
invoke the Supreme Court doctrine of personal appearance. One such
case concluded that appearance by a guardian would be adequate. 33 In
contrast, there is a holding that appearance of a person with a power of
attorney, for an incapacitated person, is wholly inadequate. 34 Also, a spe-
cial appearance to question jurisdiction, was held not to constitute an ap-
pearance that would satisfy the personal appearance doctrine.85 In one of
the few Illinois cases, both parties appeared in Nevada. The court held
that no collateral attack would be allowed.3 0
When we have personal appearances of varied types, such as a spe-
cial appearance, or an appearance by a guardian, the case in all probability
29 Evans v. Asphalt Roads & Materials Co., 194 Va. 165, 72 S.E. 2d 321 (1952).
-10 Further reference to the "personal appearance doctrine" will refer to the theory
put forth in the Sherrer and Coe cases.
31 Judkins v. Judkins, 222 N.J. Super. 516, 92 A. 2d 120 (1952).
326 N.J. 380, 78 A. 2d 896 (1951).
33 Breen v. Breen, 199 N.Y. Misc. 366, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (S. Ct., 1951).
34 Gromeeko v. Gromeeko, 110 Cal. App. 2d 117, 242 P. 2d 41 (1952).
35 Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 324 Mass. 340, 86 N.E. 2d 654 (1949). Also see the dis-
cussion in Cherry v. Cherry, 208 Ga. 213, 65 S.E. 2d 805 (1951).
3 6 Buck v. Buck, 337 111. App. 520, 86 N.E. 2d 415 (1949).
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must be tried on its relative merits in the state court until the Supreme
Court of the United States is given the opportunity to adjudicate on the
particular point in question. Until the time of the adjudication on each
particular point, it seems that an accurate attempt to predict the Court's
method of disposal of the case is wholly impossible.
In the recent case of Alton v. Alton,37 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit seems to indicate a dissatisfaction with the personal appear-
ance doctrine laid down in the Sherrer and Coe cases. The court was of
the opinion that divorce is basicly an in rem action, and the effect of the
personal appearance doctrine of the Sherrer and Coe cases would be to
convert divorce into an in personam action, in effect, by precluding an
attack on domicile if both parties appear. While the court, in the Alton
case, is careful to distinguish those cases, it actually adopts a view opposed
to the personal appearance doctrine. In the Alton case, both parties ap-
peared in the Virgin Island under a law providing that six weeks' resi-
dence in the Islands amounts to "prima facie" evidence of domicile, with-
out even the usual showing of domiciliary intent;38 the court thought
that this type of law did away with due process and was beyond the
Constitution. 9 Since both parties appeared and did not question juris-
diction, their appearance should have been sufficient to satisfy the court
that the jurisdiction was adequate, but the court instead looked to the
jurisdiction itself, and found the means of establishing same were wholly
incorrect. However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment because the question became moot upon the parties receiving a
proper divorce in another state.40
The field of divorce law has been put in a turmoil by the cases cited
and by others. The statement of the late Justice Holmes in the Haddock
case is a fair summary of the situation. He stated:
I do not suppose that civilization will come to an end whichever way this
case is decided.41
True, civilization will never come to an end because of any divorce case.
But it has been constantly strained by the results of carelessly made laws.
A possible answer for the problems in this field would be the enact-
nient of a Uniform Divorce Code that could be effective in every state
37 207 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
38 Divorce of Virgin Islands § 9, as amended, Laws 1953, Bill No. 55.
39 See the late Justice Jackson's dissent on due process in Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942), which he reaffirmed in Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 676
(1949).
40 Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
41 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1905).
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in the union and in all possessions, followed by agreements with some
of our neighbors who have recently begun to add fuel to the fire, by the
granting of "quickie divorces" to almost anyone having the postage to
apply. The recent case of Ziesniss v. Ziesniss42 could provide another
solution to the domicile problem and a partial remedy for the whole
illness, by allowing only the state where the marriage was performed
to grant the divorce.
The situation as it stands today, though understandable, is completely
inadequate. To tell your client that his divorce is good in this state, but
that its status in another state is a matter of speculation, is tragic. And
yet, this is the law. Even though one who is familiar with the jumble of
irreconcilable decisions will quickly say that a change is certainly neces-
sary, it must be recognized that such a change is a gigantic task and
would require the cooperation of all the states together with the federal
government. The fact that the problem remains unsolved leads one to
the inference that perhaps it is unsurmountable. However, realizing that
no action will work an overnight correction, it seems that the adoption
of a Uniform Divorce Code by which all of the states would agree to
be governed, would be a fundamental step in the right direction.
42 205 N.Y. Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 649 (S.Ct., 1954).
